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A New Cryptanalyti Method Using theDistribution Charateristis of SubstitutionDistanesBeomsik Song, Huaxiong Wang, Jennifer SeberryCentre for Computer Seurity ResearhShool of Information Tehnology and Computer SieneUniversity of WollongongWollongong 2522, AUSTRALIAfbs81, huaxiong, jennifer seberryguow.edu.auAbstrat. In this paper, we suggest a new method for ryptanalysisof the basi strutures of the blok iphers having SP network stru-ture. The onept of the substitution dierene is introdued and thedistribution harateristis of substitution distanes in an S-box is de-veloped. This gives lues for ryptanalysis of the ipher. We then examineif this method is appliable to ryptanalysis of Rijndael. We present themethod for ryptanalysis of the rst round of Rijndael inluding theinitial Round-Key addition part in order to illustrate our new method.Key words: Cryptanalysis, Substitution-Permutation(SP) Networks, Subtitu-tion Distane, Rijndael.1 IntrodutionCryptanalyti researh has been used to promote the development of more se-ure iphers. Some powerful ryptanalyti tools inluding DC (DifferentialCryptanalysis) [3, 4℄ and LC (Linear Cryptanalysis) [7℄ an be said to haveplayed an important role in strengthening the design riteria for blok iphers.For this reason, we assert that these ryptanalyti methods have brought aboutthe design of new blok iphers believed to be more seure than DES (DataEnryption Standard) [2℄. However, it does not be neessarily follow that be-ause these newer iphers are designed to resist the existing ryptanalyti meth-ods, they are permanently seure. This is beause ryptanalyti methods aredeveloping as well.The purpose of this paper is to suggest a new method for ryptanalysis ofthe basi strutures of the blok iphers having SP network struture. To dothis, some basi onepts are dened to be used to establish the main ideas,and the main onept of the Substitution Distane is established on the basisof these basi onepts. And after that, the method of applying this onept toryptanalysis is introdued. This method onsists of two parts, suh as nding
possible keys with a known plaintext and the determination of the keys atuallyused among those possible keys with some additional hosen (or known) plain-texts. Espeially, this method is foused on how to hoose plaintexts whih arethe most likely to selet the keys atually used among possible keys.We nd out that suitable input dierenes between the known plaintext usedfor nding possible keys and additional hosen (or known) plaintexts used for thedetermination of the keys atually used an be obtained from the distributionharateristis of the values of substitution distanes in the S-box of the ipheralgorithm. This means that if we know the substitution distanes in the S-box ofa given ipher algorithm, in ryptanalysis of the ipher algorithm we an hoosethe plaintexts having the suitable input dierenes with the plaintext used fornding possible keys. It does not depend on the keys.In the last part of this paper, we introdue the method for ryptanalysis ofthe rst round of the AES algorithm (Rijndael) inluding the initial Round-Keyaddition part in order to briey illustrate this ryptanalyti method. The newmethod we establish is unlike previous ryptanalyti methods onRijndael [5, 6℄.2 Preliminaries2.1 DenitionsDenition 1 (Sequene Dierene, Input Dierene, Input-OutputDierene). The sequene dierene is dened as the bitwise XOR of two bi-nary sequene X and X 0. If X and X 0 are input sequenes of an algorithm, wesay X  X 0 is the input dierene denoted by X. If X is an input sequeneof an algorithm, and Y is the orresponding output sequene, then we say thatX  Y is the input-output dierene denoted by IOD(X;Y ).Denition 2 (Substitution Dierene). Let a sequene X be an input se-quene of a substitution table (S-box) or funtion and the sequene S(X) bethe orresponding output sequene of the S-box. Then we say that the XORof X and S(X) is the substitution dierene between X and S(X) denoted bySD(X;S(X)). This means thatSD(X;S(X)) = X  S(X) = (x0; x1; x2;    ; xn) (s0; s1; s2;    ; sn 1):Example 1. Suppose that substitution of eah 3 bits is given by (0 0 0 !1 1 0); (0 0 1! 0 1 0); (0 1 0! 1 1 1); (0 1 1! 0 0 0); (1 0 0! 1 0 1); (1 0 1!0 0 1); (1 1 0 ! 1 0 0); (1 1 1 ! 0 1 1). Then we say that the substitutiondierene SD((1 1 0); (1 0 0)) between the input sequene X = (1 1 0) and theorresponding output sequene S(X) = (1 0 0) is(1 1 0) (1 0 0) = (0 1 0):The substitution dierenes are(1 1 0); (0 1 1); (1 0 1); (0 1 1); (0 0 1); (1 0 0); (0 1 0); and (1 0 0) (1)in turn.
Denition 3 (Substitution Distane). LetSD(X;S(X)) = X  S(X) = (d0; d1; d2;    ; dn 1)be a substitution dierene between the input sequene X and the orrespondingoutput sequene S(X). And letSD(X 0; S(X 0)) = X 0  S(X 0) = (d00; d01; d02;    ; d0n 1)be another substitution dierene between the input sequene X 0 and the or-responding output sequene S(X 0). Then the substitution distane between SD(X;S(X)) and SD(X 0; S(X 0)) is dened asSD(X;S(X)) SD(X 0; S(X 0))and denoted by SDT [SD(X;S(X)); SD(X 0; S(X 0))℄:This means thatSDT [SD(X;S(X)); SD(X 0; S(X 0))℄ = X  S(X)X 0  S(X 0)= (d0; d1; d2;    ; dn 1) (d00; d01; d02;    ; d0n 1):Example 2. Suppose that substitution dierenes are desribed as (1). Thenwe say that the substitution distane DST [(1 1 0); (0 1 1)℄ between the rstsubstitution dierene (1 1 0) and the seond substitution dierene (0 1 1) is(1 0 1): The substitution distanes between the rst substitution dierene andother substitution dierenes are(1 0 1); (0 1 1); (1 0 1); (1 1 1); (0 1 0); (1 0 0); and (0 1 0)in turn.2.2 NotationNotations are dened as follows:
X = (x0; x1; x2;    ; xn 1) : a binary sequene.X 0 = (x00; x01; x02;    ; x0n 1) : another binary sequene.X = X X 0 : the input dierene between X and X 0:S(X) = (s0; s1; s2;    ; sn 1) : the output sequene, of the S-box,orresponding to X:S(X 0) = (s00; s01; s02;    ; s0n 1) : the output sequene, of the S-box,orresponding to X 0:SD(X;S(X)) = X  S(X) : the substitution dierene between X and S(X):SD(X 0; S(X 0)) = X 0  S(X 0) : the substitution dierene betweenX 0 and S(X 0):SDT [SD(X;S(X)); SD(X 0; S(X 0))℄ : the substitution distane betweenSD(X;S(X)) and SD(X 0; S(X 0)):Y = (y0; y1; y2;    ; yn 1) : the output sequene, of the algorithm,orresponding to X:Y 0 = (y00; y01; y02;    ; y0n 1) : the output sequene, of the algorithm,orresponding to X 0:IOD(X;Y ) : the input-output dierene between X and Y .2.3 Relationships Between the Basi ConeptsIn order to desribe the Substitution-Distane Cryptanalysis learly, the rela-tionships between the basi onepts desribed above are shown in Figure 1 onthe basi struture of the SP -network-struture blok ipher algorithm. Thisstruture will be used throughout this paper.
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tors inuening the input-output dierene.
3 Priniples of Substitution-Distane Cryptanalysis3.1 Requirements for Substitution-Distane CryptanalysisIn this paper, we all the strutures like Figure 1 the basi strutures of the SP -network-struture blok ipher algorithms. The purpose of Substitution-DistaneCryptanalysis is to analyse the basi strutures of SP -network-struture blokipher algorithms. In other words, it is the purpose of Substitution-DistaneCryptanalysis to nd the keys used in the basi strutures of SP -network blokipher algorithms onsisting of the substitution, the permutation and the ad-dition of round keys. In order to do this, a known pair of a plaintext and theorresponding iphertext are used for nding possible keys, and some other ho-sen (or known) pairs of a plaintext and the orresponding iphertext are usedfor the determination of the keys atually used among those possible keys. Thenumber of pairs of a plaintext and the orresponding iphertext for the ndingof keys atually used depends on the distribution harateris of the values ofthe substitution distanes in the S-box of the given ipher. Of ourse, arefullyhosen pairs of a plaintext and the orresponding iphertext will be more helpfulthan known pairs of a plaintext and the orresponding iphertext to lighten thediÆulty of ryptanalysis.3.2 Priniple of Substitution-Distane CryptanalysisThe priniple of Substitution-Distane Cryptanalysis onsists of two parts, whihare the nding of all possible keys with a known plaintext, and the determina-tion of the keys atually used among those possible keys with some additionalknown (or hosen) plaintexts. We desribe how to hoose plaintexts having thesuitable input dierenes with the plaintext used to nd the possible keys. Forthe purpose of this priniple, we ignore the step of the permutation beause ithas no eet on this ryptanalyti method.Finding the Possible Keys. For a given algorithm like Figure 1, if a pair of aplaintextX and the orresponding iphertext Y is known, we an nd all possiblekey pairs of K#0i and K#1i (0  i < n, n is the number of the substitution pathsin the S-box) to transform X into Y by the following method. Let the numberof the substitution paths in the S-box of the algorithm be n, an input be X , andthe orresponding output be Y . Then, if we suppose that the substitution path(Ie; S(Ie)) in the S-box is used for the enryption, we an make the formulasIe = X K#0e (2)and Y = S(Ie)K#1e : (3)Also, beause we know the values of X , Y , Ie, and S(Ie), we an obtain K#0eand K#1e from (2) and (3). Now, if we onsider all possible substitution paths
from (I0; S(I0)) to (In 1; S(In 1)), we an obtain all possible key pairs of K#0iand K#1i (0  i < n) to transform X into Y . The number of all possible keypairs of K#0i and K#1i will be equal to the number of substitution paths in theS-box if the S-box uses a one-to-one orrespondene. For this reason, we andesribe the set of all possible key pairsKset = f(K#0i ;K#1i )jIi = X K#0i ; Y = S(Ii)K#1i g;where Sset = f(Ii; S(Ii))j0  i < ng. The ardinality of the Kset is equal to thatof Sset, that is jKsetj = jSsetj:Determination of the Keys Atually Used. Now, we have to selet thekey pair atually used of K#0r and K#1r among the elements of Kset of thepossible key pairs. In order to do this we need more lues. One method maybe to use another known pair of a plaintext and the orresponding iphertext.This is beause if we know another pair of a plaintext X 0 and the orrespondingiphertext Y 0, we an obtain not only another set of possible key pairsK 0set = f(K 0#0i ;K 0#1i )jIi = X 0 K 0#0i ; Y 0 = S(Ii)K 0#1i gbut also the intersetionPKset = f(K#0j ;K#1j )j(K#0j ;K#1j ) 2 Kset \K 0setgof sets Kset and K 0set. It is obvious that jPKsetj  jKsetj and jPKsetj  jK 0setj.This means that the number of possible key pairs an be redued by the onsid-eration of another known pair of a plaintext and the orresponding iphertext.However, beause the number of elements of PKset must be at least 2 by Theo-rem 1, that is jPKsetj  2, we an not perfetly determine the key pair atuallyused even now. This is beause we an only selet the key pair atually usedwhen the ardinality of PKset is 1.Theorem 1. For the basi struture of the SP -network-struture blok ipheralgorithm, let X and X 0 be enrypted with the key pair K#0r and K#1r , givingoutputs Y and Y 0 respetively. Then there must be another key pair K 0#0r andK 0#1r whih gives the same output.Proof. Let the set onsisting of all n substitution paths in the S-box be Sset,that is, Sset = f(Ii; S(Ii))j0  i < ng:Then the set onsisting of all possible key pairs to transform X into Y an bedesribed byKset = f(K#0i ; K#1i )jIi = X K#0i ; Y = S(Ii)K#1i g;
and another set onsisting of all possible key pairs to transform X 0 into Y 0 anbe desribed byK 0set = f(K 0#0i ; K 0#1i )jIi = X 0 K 0#0i ; Y 0 = S(Ii)K 0#1i g:Now, let the key pair (K#0r ;K#1r ) among the elements of Kset be the key pairatually used to transform X into Y and X 0 into Y 0. Then the path (Ir; S(Ir))and the path (Ir  X;S(Ir  X)) in the S-box have to be separately used(X is an input dierene between X and X 0 : X = X X 0). On the otherhand, it is obvious that among the elements of K 0set there is already the key pair(K 0#0r ;K 0#1r ) to transformX 0 into Y 0 with the substitution path (Ir; S(Ir)). Thiskey pair an also transform the input X into the output Y with the substitutionpath (Ir X;S(Ir X)). After all, both of these two key pairs (K#0r ;K#1r )and (K 0#0r ;K 0#1r ) an transform not only X into Y , but also X 0 into Y 0.For this reason, it is neessary to use at least two known plaintexts to deter-mine the key pair atually used among the possible key pairs to transformX intoY . In fat, in many ases, we may need many known plaintexts for the seletionof the key pair atually used beause we have to obtain the sets of K 0set, K 00set   to make the ardinality of the intersetion PKset(Kset \K 0set \K 00set   ) = 1.However, it is not easy even to ollet enough pairs of a plaintext and theorresponding iphertext. Beause of this, in order to minimize the eort inthe determination of the key pair atually used we need to arefully hoose theplaintexts, so that the ardinality of PKset beomes 1 easily. Theorem 2 showsthe relation between X 0, jKsetj, jK 0setj and jPKsetj = jKset \K 0setj .Theorem 2. For the basi struture of the SP -network-struture blok ipheralgorithm, let X be a plaintext, Y be the orresponding iphertext,Sset = f(Ii; S(Ii))j0  i < ngbe a set onsisting of all n substitution paths in the S-box, andKset = f(K#0i ;K#1i )jIi = X K#0i ; Y = S(Ii)K#1i gbe the set onsisting of all possible key pairs to transform X into Y . And letanother plaintext be X 0 and the orresponding iphertext by eah key pair inKset be Y 00 ; Y 01 ; Y 02 ;    ; Y 0n 1 respetively. Then jPKsetj = jKset \K 0setpj is equalto the number of key pairs in Kset to transform X 0 into Y 0p ,whereK 0setp = f(K 0#0i ;K 0#1i )jIi = X 0 K 0#0i ; Y 0p = S(Ii)K 0#1i ; and 0  i < ng:Proof. Trivial by the denition of intersetion.As shown in Theorem 2, in order to make jPKsetj = jKset \K 0setj as smallas possible, we need to use plaintexts eah of whih an be transformed intodiverse iphertexts by key pairs in Kset when we selet the key pair atuallyused among the possible key pairs. In other words, we need to use plaintexts
that may bring well distributed iphertexts by key pairs in Kset (iphertextswhih are not onentrated on a ertain value). These plaintexts an bring theK 0set;K 00set;K 000set;    to make jPKsetj as small as possible. The next step is tond how to obtain these plaintexts eah of whih an be transformed into welldistributed iphertexts by the key pairs in Kset. Even if these plaintexts an beobtained from the diret omputation for all plaintexts with the key pairs inK 0set,we need to establish a more eetive method of nding these plaintexts. Theorem6 shows whih plaintexts an be transformed into well distributed iphertexts.This idea is based on the relation between the input dierenes of the S-box andthe distribution harateristis of the substitution distanes in the S-box of agiven ipher algorithm. Theorems 3, 4, and 5 enable Theorem 6 to be established.Theorem 3. For the basi struture of the SP -network-struture blok ipheralgorithm, let X be a plaintext, Y be the orresponding iphertext,Sset = f(Ii; S(Ii))j0  i < ngbe the set onsisting of all n substitution paths in the S-box, andKset = f(K#0i ;K#1i )jIi = X K#0i ; Y = S(Ii)K#1i gbe the set onsisting of all possible key pairs to transform X into Y . And letanother plaintext,having the input dierene X with X, be X 0 and the orre-sponding iphertexts for eah key pair in Kset be Y 00 ; Y 01 ; Y 02 ;    ; Y 0n 1 respetively.Then Y 0p = X 0  SD(Ip X;S(Ip X)) (K#0p ;K#1p ):Proof. Beause Input-Output Dierene IOD(X;Y ) = Substitution DiereneSD(I; S(I)) Key Value (K#0;K#1) in this algorithm, we an desribeY = X  SD(Ip; S(Ip)) (K#0p ;K#1p ):If there is another plaintext X 0 having the input dierene X with X , thenX 0 = XX . Here, beause X passes through the substitution path (Ip; S(Ip))and is transformed into Y by XOR with a key pair (K#0p ;K#1p ), X 0(= XX)has to pass through the substitution path (IpX;S(IpX)) and Y 0p is equalto X 0  SD(Ip X;S(Ip X))  (K#0p ;K#1p ) by XOR with the same keypair (K#0p ;K#1p ).Theorem 4. In Theorem 3,Y 0p = X 0  SD(Ip; S(Ip)) SDT [SD(Ip; S(Ip)); SD(Ip X;S(Ip X))℄ (K#0p ;K#1p ):Proof. As SDT [SD(Ip; S(Ip)); SD(Ip  X;S(Ip  X))℄ = SD(Ip; S(Ip)) SD(Ip X;S(Ip X)) by Denition 3, it is trivial.
Theorem 5. For the basi struture of the SP -network-struture blok ipheralgorithm, let X be a plaintext, Y be the orresponding iphertext,Sset = f(Ii; S(Ii))j0  i < ngbe the set onsisting of all n substitution paths in the S-box, andKset = f(K#0i ;K#1i )jIi = X K#0i ; Y = S(Ii)K#1i gbe the set onsisting of all possible key pairs to transform X into Y . And letanother plaintext having the input dierene X with X be X 0 and the orre-sponding iphertexts by eah key pair in Kset be Y 00 ; Y 01 ; Y 02 ;    ; Y 0n 1 respetively.Then, if SDT [SD(Ip; S(Ip)); SD(Ip X;S(Ip X))℄= SDT [SD(Iq; S(Iq)); SD(Iq X;S(Iq X))℄;Y 0p = Y 0q :Proof. By Theorem 4Y 0p = X 0  SD(Ip; S(Ip)) SDT [SD(Ip; S(Ip)); SD(Ip X;S(Ip X))℄ (K#0p ;K#1p )andY 0q = X 0  SD(Iq ; S(Iq)) SDT [SD(Iq; S(Iq)); SD(Iq X;S(Iq X))℄ (K#0q ;K#1q ):Also, SD(Ip; S(Ip))  (K#0p ;K#1p )= SD(Iq ; S(Iq))  (K#0q ;K#1q ) in the abovetwo formulas beause both parts are the input-output dierene between X andY . Therefore, if SDT [SD(Ip; S(Ip); SD(Ip X;S(Ip X))℄= SDT [SD(Iq; S(Iq)); SD(Iq X;S(Iq X))℄;Y 0p = Y 0q :Theorem 6. For the basi struture of the SP -network-struture blok ipheralgorithm, let X be a plaintext, Y be the orresponding iphertext,Sset = f(Ii; S(Ii))j0  i < ngbe the set onsisting of all n substitution paths in the S-box, andKset = f(K#0i ;K#1i )jIi = X K#0i ; Y = S(Ii)K#1i gbe the set onsisting of all possible key pairs to transform X into Y . And letanother plaintext, having the input dierene X with X, be X 0 and the orre-sponding iphertexts by eah key pair in Kset be Y 00 ; Y 01 ; Y 02 ;    ; Y 0n 1 respetively.Then, the distribution harateristis of the iphertexts Y 00 ; Y 01 ; Y 02 ;    ; Y 0n 1 isequivalent to that ofSDT [SD(Ii; S(Ii)); SD(Ii X;S(Ii X))℄s; where 0  i < n:
Proof. Trivial by Theorem 5.As shown in Theorem 3, 4, 5 and 6, if we know Xs eah of whih makes thesubstitution distanes SDT [SD(Ii; S(Ii)); SD(IiX;S(IiX)℄s in a S-boxas well distributed as possible, where 0  i < n, we also obtain the plaintextseah of whih an be transformed into well distributed iphertexts for all keypairs in Kset . Beause it does not depend on keys to hoose Xs ,we anobtain these o-line without any restrition of time. Hene, we an know whihplaintexts have to be additionally hosen in the determination of the key pairreally used, when we have a pair of a plaintext and the orresponding iphertextused for nding the possible key pairs.This means that we an hoose the plaintexts to make jPKsetj = jKset\K 0setjsmallest by the distribution harateristis of substitution distanes, and reduethe number of additional plaintexts that we need for the seletion of the keypair atually used. Figure 2 is a pseudo ode showing the above idea of seletingXs in the S-box substituting 8-bit inputs into 8-bit outputs.
for(∆X=0x01; ∆X≤0xff; ∆X++)   {
     for (t=0; t<256 ;t++ ) count[t]=0x00;
     for (i=0; i<256 ;i++ ){
       t=SDT [SD(Ii,S(Ii)), SD((Ii⊕∆X), S(Ii⊕∆X)];
       count[t]=  count[t]+1;
                                       }
      value[∆X]=the greatest count[t];
                                                 }
arrange ∆Xs in increasing order of value[ ];
select the ∆X to make the number of  value[∆X]
smallest;Fig. 2. Finding the most suitable input dierenes Xs.4 Applying to Rijndael in Standard Case4.1 Outline of Rijndael in Standard CaseAs gure 3 shows, Rijndael has SP network struture and proesses data bloksof 128bits in the standard ase [1, 5℄ . The bytewise substitution by the ByteSubtransformation , the yli shift of the four bytes in eah row by the ShiftRowtransformation, and the mix of the four bytes in eah olumn by the MixColumntransformation are performed every round. After these operations, a 128-bitround key extended from an user key is XORed in the last part of every round.The MixColumn transformation is omitted in the last round, but before the rstround a 128-bit round key is XORed.
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c33Fig. 3. The struture of Rijndael in standard ase.4.2 Struture of the First Round of RijndaelFigure 4 is showing the rst round of Rijndael inluding the initial Round-Keyaddition part. Beause the ShiftRow transformation in Rijndael has no eeton the ryptanalyti method suggested on this paper, that operation is omittedin Figure 4.4.3 Finding Round Key#0 and Round Key#1Preparations. To nd Round Key#0 and Round Key#1 start with ndingthe substitution dierenes in the S-box. In the ase of Rijndael, the S-boxhas a non-linear byte substitution. The S-box onsists of 256 substitution paths,and this S-box substitutes the value of eah input byte into new value (eg :0x46! 0x5a) every round through the ByteSub transformation. However, afterthe substitution, beause all four bytes in eah olumn are mixed aeting eah
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Fig. 4. The rst round of Rijndael inluding the initial Round-Key addition.other by the matrix formula in Figure 5 through the MixColumn transformation,all four bytes in eah olumn need to be onsidered together in nding thesubstitution harateristis of the S-box.
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=Fig. 5. The MixColumn transformation of Rijndael.In other words, we need to modify the round transformation properly toobtain the four byte substitution dierenes and the substitution distanes be-tween these substitution dierenes. Beause we know both the subtitutiondierenes in the S-box used in the ByteSub transformation and the matrix
formula used in the MixColumn transformation, we an obtain the outputs ofthese operations for all sorts of four byte inputs from (0x00; 0x00; 0x00; 0x00)to (0xff; 0xff; 0xff; 0xff). Now, the new S-box having all (256)4 substitutionpaths an be obtained. This new S-box an replae the above two operationsbeause the substitution eet of this new S-box and the substitution eet ofthe above two operation is the same for all four byte inputs. As shown above,it will be helpful in the appliation of Substitution-Distane Cryptanalysis tohange ompliated round transformations in a given algorithm into a simpleS-box. The next step is to nd the Xs to obtain the well distributed valuesof the substitution distanes in the newly generated S-box. This is beause ifwe know these Xs, by Theorem 6 we an hoose the plaintexts to be used forthe determination of the key pair atually used when we obtain the possible keypairs with a known plaintext.Figure 6 is a pseudo ode to desribe this step briey.
for(∆X=0x00000001; ∆X≤0xffffffff; ∆X++){
    for (t=0; t<2564 ;t++ ) count[t]=0x00000000;
    for (i=0; i<2564 ;i++ ){
         t=SDT [SD(Ii,S(Ii)), SD((Ii⊕∆X), S(Ii⊕∆X)];
         count[t]= count[t]+1;
                                       }
    value[∆X]=the greatest count[t];
                                                                     }
arrange ∆Xs in increasing order of value[ ];
select the ∆X to make the number of  value[∆X]
smallest;Fig. 6. Finding the most suitable input dierenes Xs in Rijndael.Finding Possible Key Pairs of Round Key#0 and Round Key#1. Inorder to simplify the disussion, the method to nd the rst olumn (4 bytes) inRound Key#0 and the rst olumn (4 bytes) in Round Key#1 is desribed rst.In other words, the method of nding (k00; k10; k20; k30) and (k000; k010; k020; k030) isexplained. Let a pair omprising X = (p00; p10; p20; p30) and the orrespondingiphertext Y = (00; 10; 20; 30) be known as in Figure 4. Then, by the methodreferred in 3.2.1 we an obtain all (256)4 possible key pairs of (k00; k10; k20; k30)and (k000; k010; k020; k030) by insidering all (256)4 possible substitution paths fromIi to S(Ii) (Ii is 0x00000000 to 0xffffffff). The result is the setKset = f(K#0i ; K#1i )jIi = X K#0i ; Y = S(Ii)K#1i and 0  i < 2564g:
Determining the Key Pairs Atually Used ofRound Key#0 andRoundKey#1. As mentioned above, we an nd the set Kset onsisting of all possi-ble key pairs of the rst olumn in Round Key#0and the rst olumn in RoundKey#1. Now, we have to determine the key pair atually used among those 2564key pairs. In order to do this, we need to use some more known (or hosen)plaintexts. This is beause if we know these plaintexts we an selet the keypair atually used from the intersetion of Kset;K 0set;K 00set    (these sets an bemade by the step of nding all possible keys). If we an obtain known plaintextshaving the input dierenes Xs whih yield the well distributed values ofSDT [SD(Ii; S(Ii)); SD(Ii X;S(Ii X))℄s;where 0  i < 2564;we an determine the key pair atually used with fewer plaintexts by Theorems 2and 6. In this ase, if we have plaintexts, whih ensure jKset\K 0set\K 00set    j=1,we may determine the key pair atually used. On the other hand, if we do nothave known plaintexts satisng the above ondition, we need to obtain hosenplaintexts, whih have the input dierenes Xs with the known plaintext usedfor nding possible key pairs. These plaintexts are just the plaintexts to yieldthe well distributed values ofSDT [SD(Ii; S(Ii)); SD(Ii X;S(Ii X))℄s;where 0  i < 2564:If we know the most suitable Xs from the step of the Preparation, we anhoose the plaintexts. And then, we an nally nd the key pair atually usedby the intersetion of Kset \K 0set \K 00set    when jKset \K 0set \K 00set    j = 1.Remember that the plaintexts having the suitable input dierenesXs with theplaintext X used for nding possible key pairs have to be hosen. Otherwise, wemay need many more hosen plaintexts than minium. At the moment, beause wehave not tried to look over the substitution distanes and to inspet the suitableinput dierenes Xs, we an not know exatly the number of plaintexts weneed for the seletion of the key pair atually used. However, if we nd out theseharateristis, we may know the number of plaintexts atually neededApplying to All Columns. As shown in 4.3.2 and 4.3.3, we an selet the keypairs atually used in the rst olumns in Round Key#0 and Round Key#1.By the appliation of the same method to the seond olumn, the third olumnand the last olumn, we an nd the all olumns in Round Key#0 and RoundKey#1 (256 bytes). This means that we an nd the Round Key#0 and RoundKey#1 by onsidering 4 2564 possible key pairs of 4 bytes.5 ConlusionsWe have shown that the Substitution Distanes between the substitution pathsin the S-box an be used as the lues for ryptanalysis of the blok iphershaving SP network struture. Speially, we show how to nd all possible keyswith a known plaintext on the basi struture of the SP network blok ipher
algorithms. We explain how to selet the key atually used from these possiblekeys by the use of the distribution harateristis of the values of the substitutiondistanes in the S-box of the algorithm. In other words, we show whih inputdierenesXs are the most suitable in the seletion of the plaintexts to be usedfor the determination of the keys atually used. Along with this, we introduethe possibility of applying these priniples to ryptananalysis of the rst roundof Rijndael in order to briey illustrate this ryptanalyti method. As a resultof our eorts, we nd out that Substitution-Distane Cryptanalysis an be applyfor ryptanalysis of the basi struture of SP -network-struture blok ipheralgorithms. Remember that if we know the most suitable input dierenes (Xs: they do not depend on keys), we may nd the keys used for the enryptionon the basi round of the SP -network-struture blok ipher algorithms. Forthis reason, it is useful for the further study to nd suitable Xs for the SP -network-struture blok ipher algorithms inluding Rijndael.Referen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